

## UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

*Proposed Rule: Ballot Mail for Federal Elections*

91 Fed. Reg. 32913 (June 2, 2026)

### **COMMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS, AFL-CIO**

Prior to issuing the above-referenced proposed rule, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), in a 2022 statement, acknowledged the limited role that it is supposed to play in elections:

The role of USPS in American elections is clear and well defined: to process, transport and deliver the nation’s Election Mail, including ballots. We have *no role* in determining the extent to which mail is used for participating in elections, the design of ballots or return envelopes, or whether or how ballots are counted.<sup>1</sup>

Now, however, in a remarkable about-face, USPS seeks to directly insert itself into the election process. Under its proposed rule, the agency would no longer just serve as a conduit for election mail, but would also act as a gatekeeper, collecting voters’ names, verifying who is to receive ballots, and under certain circumstances, refusing to deliver them. Because such an unprecedented expansion of USPS’s role in elections would be both unlawful and ill-advised, the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (“NALC”) strongly opposes it.

While imposing a new layer of federal bureaucracy on state-run elections, the proposed rule would do virtually nothing to make the elections more secure. There is no reason to believe, and USPS in its proposed rule presents zero evidence, that ballot mail is currently mishandled or routinely sent to those ineligible to vote, or that state authorities are incapable of properly managing their own vote-by-mail processes. The rule is thus a purported solution to a non-existent problem.

Indeed, by requiring USPS, on tight election deadlines, to review the information on tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail, and to check it against scores of state voter lists, the proposed rule would be as likely to introduce mistakes into the voting process as it would be to reduce them. It is more likely to result in eligible voters being denied a chance to cast a timely ballot than to prevent some imagined voter fraud.

This proposed rule risks dragging USPS, a non-political public service agency, into the highly charged politics that swirl around elections. Having to police elections would also impose on USPS additional costs, of an unknown magnitude, at a time when the agency claims to be in deep financial distress. At best, this rule is a distraction. Rather than entangling itself in state-run elections, USPS should stay focused on what it was designed to do, namely, provide the American people with prompt and reliable postal delivery.

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<sup>1</sup> USPS, *2022 Post-Election Analysis: Successfully Delivering the Nation’s Election Mail During the 2022 Midterm Elections*, <https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/pdf/usps-2022-post-election-analysis.pdf> at 3 (emphasis added).

## NALC and City Letter Carriers

Founded in 1889, NALC today serves as the collective bargaining representative for USPS's nearly 200,000 city letter carriers. Our primary focus is always on improving the work lives of our members, but our advocacy extends beyond the workplace. As an organization deeply committed to preserving and promoting American democracy, NALC has been in the forefront of the effort to increase use of mail as a means to facilitate access to the ballot box. And we are proud that in recent years, our letter carrier members, in making their rounds, have delivered -- on time and securely -- many tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail.

### Voting By Mail

Americans have been voting by mail at least since the Civil War, when soldiers were allowed to cast their ballots from the battlefield.<sup>2</sup> Voting by mail has spread in recent years, as the practice has become increasingly trusted, and its advantages increasingly evident. The practice skyrocketed when the COVID pandemic hit, such that in the 2022 congressional elections nearly a third of the electorate voted by mail.<sup>3</sup> In 2024, more than 48 million mail ballots were cast.<sup>4</sup>

Today, about three-quarters of Americans live in states where all eligible voters are allowed to vote by mail, without demonstrating a reason for not doing so in person.<sup>5</sup> Eight states and the District of Columbia even mail ballots automatically to all of their active registered voters.<sup>6</sup> California alone sends ballots to approximately 23 million citizens.<sup>7</sup>

To date, USPS has successfully handled this upsurge in ballot mail.<sup>8</sup> In the 2022 congressional elections, for example, USPS delivered at least 54.4 million ballots.<sup>9</sup> According to its records, the agency took less than two days on average to deliver outgoing mail ballots and it delivered almost all of them (99.93%) in under a week.<sup>10</sup>

Even though USPS, by its own account, has handled ballot mail in an “exemplary fashion,”<sup>11</sup> it now claims the need to radically change its role in elections.

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<sup>2</sup> See National Vote at Home Institute, *Vote at Home 2024 Policy and Research Guide*, <https://voteathome.org/portfolio/vote-at-home-policy-and-research-guide-2023/> at 3.

<sup>3</sup> See P. Gronke, M. Romero, E. Shino, D. Thompson, *Vote-By-Mail in the United States: Best Practices and New Areas for Research*, MIT Election Data & Science Lab, <https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-10/vote-by-mail.pdf> at 2.

<sup>4</sup> See United States Democracy Project, *Nearly 1 in 3 Americans Voted by Mail in 2024* (Sept. 4, 2025), <https://statesunited.org/resources/americans-vote-by-mail-2024/>

<sup>5</sup> See National Vote at Home Institute, *supra* n.2, at 3.

<sup>6</sup> See *id.*

<sup>7</sup> See California State Portal, *154-Day Report of Registration*, <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/154day-primary-2026/historical-reg-stats.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> See generally USPS, *supra* n.1.

<sup>9</sup> See *id.* at 2.

<sup>10</sup> See *id.* at 1.

<sup>11</sup> See *id.*

## **The Proposed Rule**

### *New Requirements for Ballot Mail*

The proposed rule would do several things. First, it would revise USPS's *Domestic Mail Manual* to impose new standards for ballot mail used by states in federal elections. Specifically, it would require state officials responsible for sending mail ballots to eligible voters, or mailers acting on behalf of those officials, to use envelopes that bear an official logo indicating that the mail is election mail and that bear a unique barcode that meets USPS standards. *See* Proposed Rule §§ 24.1, 24.3, 91 Fed. Reg. 32917-18 (June 2, 2026). The rule would also require that the envelopes be compatible with USPS's mail automation systems. *See id.* The proposed rule states that if any mail that a state seeks to send to an eligible voter fails to comply with these strict new requirements, it "will not be accepted" by USPS. *See* Proposed Rule § 25.5.3(a), 91 Fed. Reg. 32918.

### *Registration of Voters on a USPS Portal*

In addition to setting new requirements for ballot mail, the proposed rule calls for a new digital platform, presumably to be created and managed by USPS, that would be called the "Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal" (hereafter, "the Portal"). *See* Proposed Rule § 24.4.2(b), 91 Fed. Reg. 32918. Each state would have to enter into the Portal the name and address of each individual to which the state intends to mail a ballot, along with a unique barcode for the outgoing and return envelope to be sent to that individual. *See id.* USPS would compile the information provided by each state into a registry for that state, to be called the state's "Mail-In and Absentee Participation List" (hereafter, "List"). *See* Proposed Rule § 24.4.2(a), 91 Fed. Reg. 32918. The state would be free to supplement or modify the information it enters into the Portal up to the day before the state's deadline for mailing ballots to voters. *See* Proposed Rule § 24.4.2(d), 91 Fed. Reg. 32918. Under the proposed rule, when the state brings its ballot mail to USPS to deliver to voters, USPS employees would review the mail and, if the USPS employees found that any piece of ballot mail was addressed to an individual not on the state's List, USPS would refuse to accept it. *See* Proposed Rule §§ 24.5.1, 24.5.3, 91 Fed. Reg. 32918.

### *USPS Providing Lists of Voters to State Officials*

Finally, the proposed rule requires that on or about the date of the election, USPS would "provide" the state's List, containing the names and addresses of each voter and their accompanying barcodes, to the state's chief election official. Proposed Rule § 24.4.3, 91 Fed. Reg. 32918. In other words, it would require USPS to provide the state with the List that contained the same information that the state provided to USPS. The proposed rule gives no explanation for this seemingly pointless exercise. Nor does it indicate how USPS would "provide" the List to the state official, or what, if any, measures would be taken to ensure that the transmission occurred securely.

### *Immediate Application*

This is not a proposed rule based on long and careful study. It appears to have been hastily slapped together in just a matter of weeks, in the wake of President Trump's March 31, 2026 Executive Order 14399, entitled *Ensuring Citizenship Verification, and Integrity in*

*Federal Elections* (“EO”), 91 Fed. Reg. 17125. Moreover, the proposed rule, and the far-reaching changes it would entail, appear slated to take effect nationwide immediately after the rulemaking process. There would be no gradual rollout, no initial tests or pilot programs to ensure, for example, that both state and USPS officials are fully trained and understand how the new proposed system would work; that states are prepared, operationally and financially, to conform all their ballot mail to the strict new standards; that USPS’s new Portal will be fully secure and operational; or that USPS personnel are prepared to swiftly and accurately verify the compliance of tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail.

## Discussion

### *The Proposed Rule Exceeds USPS’s Legal Authority*

NALC objects to the proposed rule first because, as explained below, it exceeds USPS’s legal authority.

#### *USPS Lacks Legal Authority to Establish a Voter Registry and to Verify Ballot Mail*

Congress created USPS in 1970 with the enactment of the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), 39 U.S.C. §§ 101 *et seq.* Nothing in that statute authorizes USPS to collect and maintain a registry of voters’ names and addresses or to verify that ballot mail is addressed to those listed on the registry. Those activities are plainly *ultra vires*.

The PRA gives USPS a limited set of specific powers. *See* 39 U.S.C. § 404(a). None of the enumerated powers says anything about USPS inserting itself in the election process. Indeed, the PRA makes clear that the agency’s “basic function” is to provide the nation with “postal services,” 39 U.S.C. § 101(a), which the statute defines as “the delivery of letters, printed matter, or mailable packages, including acceptance, collection, sorting, transportation, or other functions ancillary thereto.” *Id.* § 102(5). Establishing a registry of voters, and policing whether states’ ballot mail matches the registry, falls far afield of this definition of “postal service.”

The PRA defines “any service that is not a postal service” as a “nonpostal service.” 39 U.S.C. § 404(e)(1). With certain exceptions not applicable here, the statute says that USPS is not permitted to engage in nonpostal services. *Id.* § 404(e)(2).<sup>12</sup> Because the USPS election mechanisms proposed in the rule would be “nonpostal services” outside the limited exceptions contained in the statute, they are not permitted by the PRA.

To attempt to justify the rule, USPS cites the first specific power enumerated in the PRA, *see* 91 Fed. Reg., 32915, namely, the power to “provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.” 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1). Nothing in that statutory language, however,

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<sup>12</sup> The exceptions are for (1) nonpostal services that existed prior to 2006, *see* 39 U.S.C. § 404(e)(2), and (2) services that USPS provides to federal, state or local governments that meet certain statutorily defined criteria, including that they are designed to increase USPS’s revenues and that they result in USPS at least breaking even, *see id.* §§ 3701-04.

remotely concerns the establishment of a registry of voters or the right to condition the acceptance of ballot mail on its matching the names and addresses in the registry.

USPS also cites, *see* 91 Fed. Reg. 32915, its general power “to adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this title, *as may be necessary* in the execution of its functions under this title and such other functions as may be assigned to the Postal Service under any provisions of law outside of this title.” 39 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (emphasis added). This language means USPS can make rules “necessary” to carry out the specific powers Congress gave it in the PRA (or that Congress gave it in some other legislation). The cited language does not authorize USPS to promulgate rules that *expand* its powers beyond those set by Congress.

Finally, USPS cites, *see* 91 Fed. Reg. 32915, President Trump’s March 31, 2026 Executive Order 14399 (“EO”). The EO, at Section 3, directs USPS to propose a rule that includes each of the items that USPS proposes here. *See* 91 Fed. Reg. 17126. The proposed rule thus appears compliant with the EO. However, as multiple pending lawsuits demonstrate, the EO is itself plainly unauthorized. The President lacks authority to regulate elections. As one court put it, in blocking key parts of President Trump’s 2025 election-related executive order, “our Constitution does not allow the President to impose unilateral changes to federal election procedures.” *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the President*, 818 F. Supp. 3d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2026); *see also* *Washington v. Trump*, 814 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1186-87 (W.D. Wash. 2026); *California v. Trump*, 786 F.Supp.3d 359, 371 (D. Mass. 2025).

An executive order must rest on authority given to the President by either the Constitution or by a federal statute. *See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (“[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself”); *Minnesota v. Mille Lac Bands of Chippewa Indians*, 526 U.S.172, 188-90 (1999) (holding executive order unauthorized when lacked constitutional or statutory basis). The Constitution vests in the states the power to determine how elections are conducted, subject only to supervision by Congress. *See* Const. Art. 1, Sec. 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations ....”); *League*, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 59-61 (state and congressional power to regulate elections also extends to presidential elections). Accordingly, the “Constitution entrusts Congress and the States -- not the President -- with the authority to regulate federal elections.” *Washington*, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 1187 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

The EO cites two statutes -- the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-11, and the 2002 Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145 -- but neither provides the President the authority to involve USPS in elections in the manner outlined in the EO. The NVRA was primarily intended to facilitate the registration of voters. *See California*, 786 F.Supp.3d at 373. The HAVA established a funding program to support state administration of elections and required an independent federal agency, the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”), to distribute the funding in accordance with statutory mandates. *See id.* at 374.

Indeed, it is not clear that the President has *any* authority to give commands to USPS. The PRA established USPS as an “independent” executive agency, *see* 39 U.S.C. § 201, governed by its own Board of Governors, *see id.* §202. In one of the cases sustaining a challenge to President Trump’s 2025 executive order, the court found that the order’s mandate to the EAC, an independent federal agency, constituted “undue interference” in the workings of that agency. *California*, 786 F.Supp.3d at 381. The 2026 EO similarly constitutes undue interference with the independence of USPS.

In sum, neither the PRA nor the EO provides USPS with legal authority for the proposed rule.

#### *USPS Lacks Authority to Refuse Ballot Mail*

As explained above, USPS’s proposed election Portal and ballot mail verification process exceed USPS’s authority under the PRA. So, too, does USPS’s proposed refusal to accept ballot mail under certain circumstances. In the PRA, Congress provided a long and detailed list of “nonmailable matter,” such as certain perishable or overweight items, or certain carefully defined types of fraudulent or misleading commercial messages. *See, e.g.*, 39 U.S.C. § 3001. USPS has no authority on its own to add to this legislatively crafted list. Yet, USPS’s refusal to deliver ballot mail under certain circumstances would in effect do just that.

#### *USPS Would Likely Violate the PRA by Providing States a Voter List*

USPS would also likely violate the PRA by providing the state’s chief election official with the List containing the names and addresses of those enrolled to vote by mail. *See* Proposed Rule § 24.4.3, 91 Fed. Reg. 32918. PRA Section 412(a) provides that “[e]xcept as specifically provided by subsection (b) or other law, no officer or employee of the Postal Service shall make available to the public by any means or for any purpose any mailing or other list of names or addresses (past or present) of postal patrons or other persons.” 39 U.S.C. § 412(a). The sole exception, in PRA Section 412(b), allows USPS to provide the Secretary of Commerce with address information for purposes of the federal census. *See* 39 U.S.C. § 412(b). The List that USPS would provide to the state’s chief election officer would be a list of postal patrons within the scope of PRA Section 412(a). The only question would be whether providing the List to the state’s chief election officer would amount to making it “available to the public” in violation of Section 412(a). It likely would, unless state law shielded the List from public disclosure. Moreover, the sole exception, in Section 412(b), to the Section 412(a) prohibition, for information provided to the Secretary of Commerce, suggests that providing information to a government official would violate Section 412(a), absent a statutory exception. Since the PRA contains no exception for information provided to a state’s chief election official, providing the List to that official would likely violate the PRA.

#### *There is No Evidence that the Proposed Rule Would Improve the Vote by Mail Process*

NALC opposes the proposed rule not only because it exceeds USPS’s authority under the PRA, but also because it would serve no effective purpose. The federal government, of which USPS is part, has long been guided by the regulatory philosophy that “agencies should only promulgate such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are

made necessary by *compelling public need*.”<sup>13</sup> Here, USPS presents no evidence of any compelling need for the additional layers of federal regulation that it proposes.

First, USPS identifies no need, let alone a compelling need, to impose strict new ballot mail standards. As USPS has acknowledged, without those proposed new standards, it already does an “exemplary” job of delivering ballot mail on time and securely.<sup>14</sup>

To try to justify the strict new standards for ballot mail, USPS asserts that the official mail logo would make ballot mail easier to identify; automation compatibility would make it easier to process; and unique barcodes would make it easier to track. *See* 91 Fed. Reg. 32916. Maybe that is so, but USPS identifies no occasions in which the *absence* of the official mail logo, automation compatibility, or barcodes had any detrimental impact on USPS’s ability to efficiently and securely process ballot mail.

Moreover, even if there were a problem to solve, USPS presents no evidence that the proposed new standards would solve it. USPS presents no proof – no report, study or analysis – demonstrating that the new ballot mail standards that it proposes would make any material difference in how efficiently or securely ballot mail is processed. The federal government has long required that an agency proposing a new rule base its decision “on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information.”<sup>15</sup> Moreover, USPS is an institution where proposed changes are typically subject to careful study and deliberation. Both USPS’s oversight agency, the Postal Regulatory Commission, and its institutional watchdog, USPS’s Office of Inspector General, routinely issue detailed studies and reports scrutinizing all aspects of postal operations.<sup>16</sup> Yet here USPS provides no report, study or analysis demonstrating that the proposed new standards would make a material difference to the processing of ballot mail.

Similarly, USPS fails to prove any need, let alone a compelling one, for USPS to verify that every piece of ballot mail is addressed to someone on the state’s List. USPS cites no evidence that states tend to mail ballots to individuals *not* on their voter lists. In any event, USPS presents no evidence – no report, study or finding – that this happens frequently enough to justify the cost and effort of having USPS personnel verify tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail.

Finally, as noted, the proposed rule would require USPS to “provide” each state with the state’s List, comprised of the very same names, addresses and other information that the state provided to USPS. USPS does not even attempt to explain how this would serve any purpose.

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<sup>13</sup> Executive Order 12866 (“EO 12866”), 58 Fed. Reg. No. 190, at § 1(a) (Sept. 30, 1993) (emphasis added).

<sup>14</sup> *See* USPS, *supra* n.1.

<sup>15</sup> EO 12866, *supra* n.13, at § 1(b)(6).

<sup>16</sup> *See, e.g.*, USPS Office of Inspector General White Papers, <https://www.uspsoidg.gov/reports/white-papers/oigs-oversight-us-postal-services-delivering-america-plan-volume-3> and Postal Regulatory Commission, <https://prc.gov/prc-reports> .

### *The Proposed Rule Would Create the Risk that Eligible Voters Would Be Denied the Right to Vote*

While not solving any problems, the proposed rule would likely create new ones. First, the proposed rule would create a non-negligible risk that USPS would erroneously refuse to accept legitimate ballot mail. The rule would impose on USPS personnel the immense task of checking the names, addresses and bar codes on tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail and confirming that information against the Lists of dozens of different states. These USPS personnel, who are not trained election officials, would have to perform this task in a compressed timeframe, often probably just days before the election. In addition, the state Lists would be moving targets, since states could, and almost certainly would, continuously supplement or modify them right up until the deadline for mailing ballots. All this creates a situation ripe for error. USPS could try to minimize human error by employing computer technology to aid with the verification process, but that technology is far from flawless, especially since the capital-starved USPS – an agency that struggles just to keep its vehicle fleet in good repair – lacks the resources for state-of-the-art software systems.<sup>17</sup>

The consequences of error in the verification process would be profound: it could result in USPS improperly refusing to accept ballots destined to eligible voters. With tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail in play, even an extremely low error rate could easily translate into hundreds or thousands of improperly refused pieces of ballot mail. Moreover, because election deadlines are tight, even if USPS discovered and corrected some errors, it might be too late for the voter's ballot to count. In effect, the proposed rule could become a voter suppression mechanism, even if that is not USPS's intent.

Voter suppression on a far grander scale could conceivably occur if a state's election officials failed (as a result of error) or refused (on principle) to submit voter information to USPS as the rule would require. In that event, USPS would presumably have to reject *all* ballot mail in that state.

### *The Rule Would Create a Risk of a Catastrophic Information Breach*

The proposed rule would also create a risk that the trove of voter data collected by USPS could fall into the wrong hands. USPS is not at the cutting edge of cybersecurity. For example, after one incident in which USPS suffered “a significant cyber intrusion” that “compromised large amounts of data,” USPS's Inspector General found that the agency's protections fell short on several fronts: “Postal Service leadership had not emphasized cybersecurity, as evidenced by its undertrained employees, lack of accountability for risk acceptance decisions, ineffective collaboration among cybersecurity teams, and continued operations of unsupported systems.”<sup>18</sup> The Portal proposed here, containing the names and addresses of tens of millions of voters, would be a tempting target for bad actors, particularly agents of hostile foreign governments seeking to interfere with American elections. These agents could either steal data or sabotage the ballot review process, or both. The recent rise of AI-

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<sup>17</sup> See Gov't Accountability Office, *U.S. Postal Service: Action Needed to Improve Credibility of Cost Assumptions for Next Generation Delivery Vehicles* (April 2023), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106677.pdf> at 4

<sup>18</sup> USPS Office of Inspector Gen., *U.S. Postal Service Cybersecurity Functions*, Audit Report No. IT-AR-15-008 (July 17, 2015), at 1, [https://www.uspsoidg.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usps\\_cybersecurity\\_functions.pdf](https://www.uspsoidg.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-01/usps_cybersecurity_functions.pdf).

enhanced hacking technology makes the risk of a breach that much greater. Because the proposed USPS Portal is unnecessary and would do nothing to improve elections, there is no reason to create such a risk of a potentially catastrophic data breach.

### *The Rule Would Impose an Unnecessary Financial Burden on Both USPS and the States*

Federal guidance has long required agencies to “assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and ... propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”<sup>19</sup> Here, USPS presents no cost-benefit analysis justifying the proposed rule. Nor does it appear that a cost-benefit analysis could justify the rule.

For whatever dubious benefits the rule might yield, it would impose on USPS the costs of creating and maintaining the Portal and having its personnel verify tens of millions of pieces of ballot mail. Any responsible piece of proposed rulemaking would attempt to at least estimate the magnitude of this cost. USPS does not even try. In any event, whatever the magnitude of the cost, it would be an unnecessary and unwelcome addition to USPS’s balance sheet, at a time when the agency claims to be in financial distress. According to its own reports, in fiscal year 2025, USPS suffered a net loss of about \$9 billion.<sup>20</sup> Since fiscal year 2021, it has reportedly lost a total of about \$31 billion.<sup>21</sup> The Postmaster General has warned that the agency could run out of cash by early 2027.<sup>22</sup> To save money, it has even suspended mandatory payment of pension contributions for its employees.<sup>23</sup> USPS should not be undertaking the new and unnecessary expense of policing state elections when it claims that it cannot even afford to make mandatory employee retirement payments.

The financial burden of the rule would also fall on states, particularly those whose ballot mail is not yet compliant with the proposed new standards. Here, too, USPS makes no effort to estimate the cost that states and their taxpayers would bear when forced to upgrade millions of pieces of ballot mail, by affixing them with official election logos and barcodes and making them automation compatible. Mandating that states bear such costs, without any discussion of their magnitude or how they would be funded, adds yet another objectionable feature to this ill-advised proposed rule.

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<sup>19</sup> EO 12866, *supra* n.13, at § 1(b)(6).

<sup>20</sup> See USPS, *U.S. Postal Service Reports Fiscal Year 2025 Results* (Nov. 14, 2025), [U.S. Postal Service Reports Fiscal Year 2025 Results - Newsroom - About.usps.com](https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2025/0508-usps-reports-fiscal-year-2025-results.htm).

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, *U.S. Postal Service, Action Needed to Fix Unsustainable Business Model* (Dec. 2025), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107336.pdf> at 1-2

<sup>22</sup> *US Postal Service hiring restructuring advisers as it could run out of money in 2027*, Reuters (March 4, 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/business/us-postal-service-hiring-restructuring-advisers-it-could-run-out-money-2027-2026-03-04/>.

<sup>23</sup> See USPS, *U.S. Postal Service Reports Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2026 Results*, <https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2026/0508-usps-reports-second-quarter-fiscal-year-2026-results.htm> (May 8, 2026).

*Conclusion*

For the reasons explained above, NALC urges USPS to withdraw the proposed rule.

Dated: June 26, 2026

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